1. 0b09df11097038ab861d6091e81b83e24f39163a  ./djia-stock-prices-14-Oct-09.txt
2. be7508d86b311b51c5c9cfadea9f23051dd77acb  ./ward1/MeetingFourIn.xml
3. b8913d2f7c3229587b681785c78fd766e45ba213  ./ward1/MeetingFourOut.xml
4. a317ef3f8d3ee5b6c8fbdd81d0b2aa4525536227  ./ward1/PrintAuditBallots.xml
5. 105da835e157419c8c7226c60e4f974c763bdaf6  ./ward1/PrintAuditMixnet.xml
6. 4c2bac2a7375e27ddb72e8107ce460558d5a4a5a  ./ward1/ReplyToContestedCodes.xml
7. 73554e741d69cad7d5264b74ab756305f50c1be0  ./ward1/SpoiledBallotsFromScanner.xml
8. 440d840786f16822dc2c270fcbfaf8113dfa75df  ./ward1/SpoiledBallotsPid.xml
9. adb410a66ae203bfa0b6bbdb963fe4af5e8caf9c  ./ward2/MeetingFourIn.xml
10. 907a1d9dfd180acdd442ae91800a0371537f3d44  ./ward2/MeetingFourOut.xml
11. 09aef26844519771167c15da9e51be4bdf2a2ea0  ./ward2/PrintAuditBallots.xml
12. fa598f86512975723db06e9b9eeceaec92b746f9  ./ward2/PrintAuditMixnet.xml
13. d4564e745258d36a23975e2d5c8839649ab26ec4  ./ward2/ReplyToContestedCodes.xml
14. 5f65f44af911c0caa3e042d2d19f864351ce4923  ./ward2/SpoiledBallotsFromScanner.xml
15. a123007faac80ac9a06a74b6b9fb25f55aa417b9  ./ward2/SpoiledBallotsPid.xml
16. fa4742d5504672dfce6eb2750fd87400f3d32ec8  ./ward3/MeetingFourIn.xml
17. 9a97ebb615f815d1954b6944fc102ad0c49c8bb4  ./ward3/MeetingFourOut.xml
18. afd760d686397aebd0364c8f47da91dbfb44454b  ./ward3/PrintAuditBallots.xml
19. a8b4bee76bdd2a2523cdcc615173e55f744b3e41  ./ward3/PrintAuditMixnet.xml
20. e1c7a061d6abcba0e083e6e68bf40086e2408797  ./ward3/ReplyToContestedCodes.xml
21. be4f5a9c6ddf2f6e3f88795abaa61bd642623f73  ./ward3/SpoiledBallotsFromScanner.xml
22. 82134273bad243f1d2670df04773bf25203c4eeb  ./ward3/SpoiledBallotsPid.xml
23. cf2fca46ac1dfeb48af7f43f2b861f6e686c9c37  ./ward4/MeetingFourIn.xml
24. 0db5580a85566edacd6219943917f122e55a7b53  ./ward4/MeetingFourOut.xml
25. c951619d363aa5db19cf9ad795b40e5519f618cc  ./ward4/PrintAuditBallots.xml
26. c35eff3fb010a5e47ac12a874829f8b0763b2539  ./ward4/PrintAuditMixnet.xml
27. bec616d20e8af1e4cce8efbc5adf48d738147574  ./ward4/ReplyToContestedCodes.xml
28. c4a82715183e665cb106bbcc32b0091e5c20916f  ./ward4/SpoiledBallotsFromScanner.xml
29. 35c749ebe920a547a304159f560d086ad0c3b4ab  ./ward4/SpoiledBallotsPid.xml
30. 968472f25a4ca6c21d9e34d6956e81be0247021a  ./ward5/MeetingFourIn.xml
31. a9df28445efd5a3c7736c94b6036b99542f5d3cf  ./ward5/MeetingFourOut.xml
32. e8d099dfba457e27bcb2e9e53022caba2ec55e20  ./ward5/PrintAuditBallots.xml
33. 57bec2f3f79329a7ab4afc082dcbafd0eeb54541  ./ward5/PrintAuditMixnet.xml
34. 7ef4166284ce4cf131d26591d81102b436fbd244  ./ward5/ReplyToContestedCodes.xml
35. e5e24ad90beeadc3bb42a9f71847b58d5dd97c02  ./ward5/SpoiledBallotsFromScanner.xml
36. e5e24ad90beeadc3bb42a9f71847b58d5dd97c02  ./ward5/SpoiledBallotsPid.xml
37. 2697e021a1f763aa03d42f644e70540660b5cc6c  ./ward6/MeetingFourIn.xml
38. 9c31ff18113798e9d443565d691f5c1cefff5217  ./ward6/MeetingFourOut.xml
39. ae9a132a1e025d7fb5adc884e803ae77fd9e1d7f  ./ward6/PrintAuditBallots.xml
40. b9294c5249eba3e578107263c88b5adb80f9c8fb  ./ward6/PrintAuditMixnet.xml
41. 0b9ba0fd45070d084f88620443356a9f6cc4a947  ./ward6/ReplyToContestedCodes.xml
42. 197ad6baf83146e3afb22e910080d78646c0601b  ./ward6/SpoiledBallotsFromScanner.xml
43. 360ca86dced88a5fa5f52842240316ae10cc1d00  ./ward6/SpoiledBallotsPid.xml

Setting up the optical scanners for the election in Takoma Park

Codes for provisional ballots that were judged valid and ballots that did not initially scan properly have been added to the website.

Turnout was higher than we had anticipated (but not more than what we had prepared for)! Results and code checking are available!

Congratulations to the Winners, and special thanks to Takoma Park!

Results files (signed) are uploading to the repository as we speak. The hashes are:

1. cd5fb63bedf65bf4c3c5ad4b72f78f7371bee075  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/MeetingThreeIn.xml
2. 4f198abed5a709f32f1a15e54d0c631f8838d786  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/MeetingThreeIn.xml.asc
3. c81dc2b32cd0f22f91270586bdf75017468f7e95  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/MeetingThreeIn.xml.asc.asc
4. e2ec47f4a453157d943a73ef994b5910bd848605  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/MeetingThreeOut.xml
5. 2b4df6b9fe6f7c6bbbe355373660e1702f7ac542  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/MeetingThreeOut.xml.asc
6. ceb86f0f9da03d01504edd4a2b3e1b12cce765c1  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml
7. 182115227e502a987891973b68bdf3a06f90495b  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml.asc
8. 3f68597f2f7f386e7fa8e2e84eedf96cdebd40f0  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/MeetingThreeIn.xml
9. c0c1c63bd1380c8d32084282fdd0804ad96b0853  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/MeetingThreeIn.xml.asc
10. 4fe4c7fd7e20e9baa1dee0e6b92e8e29a58336e0  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/MeetingThreeIn.xml.asc.asc
11. 481a07ad3c0b36ad398e642d21a78f4b30b90dda  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/MeetingThreeOut.xml
12. 5e210b518b34708bca6d9e52f0abd91a26ba44a2  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/MeetingThreeOut.xml.asc
13. ccb1aa5d53a144ccbad8e24f20fa69d4da408ca6  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml
14. f521f975b02d0b6ffb4075025578ad8900e3fe0d  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml.asc
15. ab9176cdb775a25709dead8120ededa8a06423f3  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml.asc.asc
16. 4c224ee83498d3af224333e02a2a97b307c67381  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/MeetingThreeIn.xml
17. c606b52d97d6485aaf4993a1e206841b8afa9040  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/MeetingThreeIn.xml.asc
18. ca15f4639b093f348dd6fe907c6cf397895cdf3a  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/MeetingThreeOut.xml
19. e153fbd7bd3b2b20d02176471956fbfef1e69469  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/MeetingThreeOut.xml.asc
20. 5bc2ad387b7105a1c717fa1ed3771b315ee28bac  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml
21. 5258f936958b298d336cd9b062fc1dabd1accbe7  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml.asc
22. 5004a15643994d0b24f3f2407c987d44be748f16  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml.asc.asc
23. c7982b3fb935e2d7c5ca5453208b6021a7b86c9f  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/MeetingThreeIn.xml
24. eb33dcbbe23d518e97d7a8a86e41dd7cb87a8090  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/MeetingThreeIn.xml.asc
25. 530ee591c426cf0a5a31530655813e879ce43847  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/MeetingThreeOut.xml
26. aedce657f55c1dd9f045ce4052f3ce4f01809243  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/MeetingThreeOut.xml.asc
27. 51a06c7e46a90b8eba8e9585b91ed697eb9095d2  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml
28. 3acf2e648649b9280a0a7f9bb0a2efa47ff8de28  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml.asc
29. 6b20429c70ff9c18f5a8a4689e70cd520b8ead70  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/MeetingThreeIn.xml
30. 7edc4a6b07329b32fae15fd2012b297ee8ad7698  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/MeetingThreeIn.xml.asc
31. a1a32f657e0978b65e0e902ed85bc231de68687d  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/MeetingThreeOut.xml
32. 55271060591e27bf1e1df72c4d95a10a8c47dc2c  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/MeetingThreeOut.xml.asc
33. 60dd5c407cac14f6b2d5cba1cc2579d0445cebe6  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml
34. 621e2fda4d136c4dc414dbd4192c20ed94f3c6d2  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml.asc
35. b5d4a41c6c40fcd3bf59abc9326c527265fac9ba  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml.asc.asc
36. 73b856db516c76690407c9732cf4dfed75b7a5bf  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/MeetingThreeIn.xml
37. 59160aeb0bf349c2ecb79b2137be37aba6d75fbc  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/MeetingThreeIn.xml.asc
38. 98cf3922a1c9b7509c23e5d49ac8125c7a3b5174  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/MeetingThreeOut.xml
39. 3685d332de49995ccc2105610cbcf063140cd847  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/MeetingThreeOut.xml.asc
40. 09597c195561e88943cf6057afbeb666e23e2942  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml
41. 61393cf3ee063783f6edeca9e432ff79c99e466c  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/MeetingThreeOutCodes.xml.asc
42. 4f73487574f8436acea6ebfc5938f16339c68628  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/election(2).log
43. 3530c14a08ff48178137a4145282214fb1e5bcf6  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/election(2).log.asc
44. 5c7af4ee15dde719240ed2f332ba41e29280d3ca  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/election(2).log
45. eaad9baad5ee665e831ed564a9e4aff3c4fc0c8f  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/election(2).log.asc
46. c544b9b7a109ca08f71ff9fd3081d7ebe0083fd5  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/election(2).log
47. c11a2f64241df411a8846e826dbccc6f30706928  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/election(2).log.asc
48. a543cd1aa09b6391b388dc32a3103da21bf2d077  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/election(2).log
49. 7982972247fee28917a0b9dd778d1d50ca60eecd  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/election(2).log.asc
50. 250a101ff482cb184b42c677bdb4a3b21438da87  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/election(2).log
51. 0ce308edfaf5c854a7d6c83a81fad981af702799  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/election(2).log.asc
52. 8e85924542de763628cd2a16bcb36fa2004dde0e  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/election(2).log
53. e3fed6c89a72364f7918e8dbf0a5e5a140e1b5a0  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/election(2).log.asc

PRESS RELEASE

Breakthrough open-source election system used in official election lets voters audit tally online

Takoma Park, Maryland, November 3, 2009 — For the first time, a government election will allow voters to check that their private votes are correctly recorded and included in the final tally. Takoma Park, Maryland is running its bi-annual election for mayor and city council using a new system called Scantegrity. After casting their optically-scanned ballot at the polling place this Tuesday, voters will be able to check “confirmation codes” for their votes on the city’s website.

The codes are revealed, for each “oval” a voter fills on the ballot, by an “invisible ink” system akin to that used in children’s puzzle books. Voters may, if they wish, note the codes and the ballot serial number while in the booth. Because the codes are separately randomized for each oval and for each ballot, nothing about who a voter has voted for is revealed by the codes on the website.

The cost of the system is significantly lower than that of current systems since it is fully open source, the scanning setup uses commercial off-the-shelf scanners, and all printing is done with office printers.

The Scantegrity technology was developed by cryptographer David Chaum together with researchers from the University of Maryland Baltimore County, The George Washington University, MIT, the University of Ottawa and the University of Waterloo.  The group has run a number of elections for universities and other organizations and also successfully demonstrated the technology last April during a public mock election administered by Takoma Park’s Board of Elections.

Student members of the project won first prize in the National Science Foundation sponsored University Student Voting Competition in 2007, and the Scantegrity system has evolved from there. A broader research community has grown around proposals for such “voter-verifiable” election systems. The number of academic conferences on the subject has seen an increase ¾ from one every two years during the early part of the decade to two every year for the last few years. Also, the National Institute of Standards and Technology had a workshop on the theme in October this year.

Before the election, encrypted items of data are posted on the election website. Some will not be decrypted, but the individual keys needed to decrypt others will be posted after the tallies are declared. Keys are carefully chosen so as to protect ballot secrecy, and the unpredictability of the key selection is based on the impossible-to-predict closing prices and volumes of a set of high-tech stocks. This lets anyone verify a public audit, ensuring that the official election results are consistent with the published confirmation codes while protecting ballot secrecy.

“Something I find particularly exciting about the technology,” says David Chaum, “is that it is robust enough to be used anywhere in the world — scanners at polling places can speed posting of results, but actually a Scantegrity polling place needs only ballots, pens and a ballot box.”

“We learned a lot from working with the Board of Elections and the City Clerk of Takoma Park, who generously shared with us the wisdom obtained from running real elections,” says Prof. Poorvi L. Vora of The George Washington University. “It’s one thing to develop a voting system, it’s quite another to have one that can be used in a real election.”

“This represents a significant step in the evolution of election systems,” says Prof. Ron Rivest of MIT, “and though we’ve worked hard within the constraints of this volunteer project, it is only a first step for a whole range of promising new types of such systems.”

“The secret ballot and voter privacy are central to democratic elections. EPIC’s voting project encourages innovative election technology solutions like Scantegrity when they support voter privacy, while at the same time assuring election integrity,” said Lillie Coney, associate director of the Electronic privacy Information Center (EPIC). “This is one of many solutions being sought by dedicated computing professionals interested in preserving the independent secret ballot for all voters”, concluded Ms. Coney. EPIC is providing election audit services for the Takoma Park Election.

Those following along with our blog have likely noticed that we have run two meetings for the Takoma Park election. Here is a quick recap of these meetings and a preview of the remaining meetings.

Meeting One (Election Setup). This was held Monday, October 12. The purpose of Meeting One is to establish a group of trustees for the election, and a minimum number of trustees need to conduct the rest of the meetings. Cryptographers will recognize this a threshold scheme. The trustees supply passphrases, which are used to generate all the cryptographic data needed to provide verification. Since this same data can be regenerated any time the same passphrases are supplied, we do not have to retain any secret data about the election in between meetings. To prevent the data from being changed, it is locked in time by posting a cryptographic commitment to it.

Meeting Two (Electronic Ballot Creation and Audit). This was held Wednesday, October 14. Once the data has been created and committed to, a universally-verifiable audit is performed to detect any problems with it. Any errors, faults, or fraud would be caught after the election regardless of this step; however this allows us to catch any problems before printing the ballots and running the election. To make sure the problems aren’t cleverly hidden, the data is first committed to so the locations of any problems can’t be changed (the first meeting) and then the data is checked at random locations (this meeting).

However, how do we choose the random locations? And furthermore, how can you at home be sure that they were truly random? Flipping a coin or rolling dice would give us random numbers but there is no way for you, the reader, to know we actually did that, instead of cleverly choosing the exact numbers needed to avoid exposing any problems with the data. To address this, we use stock market data to do the selection for us. Stocks are nice because they are accepted to have a degree of randomness, they are hard to manipulate on a large scale, and closing prices are available in most daily newspapers or readily online. The reason for holding Meeting One a day before Meeting Two is to ensure that the difficulty of getting away with cheating is on the order of predicting, to the cent, the exact closing price (and closing volume) of a large selection of stocks one day in advanced. The stock data is then run through a hash function, which assures that excellent predictions, even ones off by only a single value, are of no use (the same as a prediction that is completely wrong).

Meeting Three (Results Posting). This will be held Tuesday, November 3rd (the night of the election). The meeting will allow a tally to calculated and posted, as well as psoting the status of each ballot in the election (voted, provisionally voted, spoiled, or unused/audited for printing errors). For voted ballots, the confirmation codes will be posted online so voters can verify they match what they selected in the voting booth. Since codes are randomly assigned, knowing someone else’s code doesn’t allow you to determine how they voted.

Meeting Three-B (Provisional Ballots). If necessary, this will be held Wednesday, November 4rd. It will add to the tally the votes from any provisional ballots deemed acceptable.

Meeting Four (Final Audit). This is scheduled to be held Monday, November 9 (subject to change). The final audit will resolve any issues that voters raise about confirmation codes not matching what they wrote down. Once these are resolved, the election data committed to in the very first meeting will be again checked against the posted confirmation codes to make sure it is consistent with the final tally of the election. This check is much like the check done in meeting two, and requires random selections using stock data.

Want to read more? Ben Adida’s ongoing series on auditing the Scantegrity election is a good place for up-to-date information. The Scantegrity “Learn More” page has an introductory video, as well as links to academic papers published about the system. Finally, this paper provides an overview how stock prices can be used for random selections in elections. The idea of using stock prices for public randomness was proposed earlier in this RFC and this paper.

Ben Adida has an excellent post with his take on describing how the audit process works. I highly encourage readers to check it out.

Here are the sha1sums for the new files. They were added last night @ 8:19 according to the commits list.

1. bbb90bdd671222552968a3bc827def7ca2a12623  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/MeetingTwoIn.xml
2. 8def140117b0f2d3e3862036764f0c91b2e16e1a  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/MeetingTwoOut.xml
3. e4f174e593f6074fcaea4775dbef4b8e153598ca  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/MeetingTwoOutCommitments.xml
4. f1aaa1222ba5a451879ce1a8e9a6807cd4f2a07e  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/MeetingTwoIn.xml
5. 15670e64944007b8b672f761f9b268cd0a7c807b  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/MeetingTwoOut.xml
6. cb60de60802ec2989a40fe844264f0ab6f807ed8  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/MeetingTwoOutCommitments.xml
7. 52ac82dbaaca18457ba20e02034c2d7ca5a936ed  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/MeetingTwoIn.xml
8. 4d7be21a36e434ed42eaebcd7a80bbe1a8023a57  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/MeetingTwoOut.xml
9. bc2eb0fdd8b2f212d4af4f795865d2e94a5a0cde  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/MeetingTwoOutCommitments.xml
10. 45d59993b931b0570339e7c5a9f61dce811d8c1c  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/MeetingTwoIn.xml
11. 3bd294c002c50ab8f78a614cda2bd597fc2e9519  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/MeetingTwoOut.xml
12. b87f42562a7734f3f4bac4348ba83d66df9de236  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/MeetingTwoOutCommitments.xml
13. c848141539ed590158f48841cea2e79ff07c2d27  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/MeetingTwoIn.xml
14. f9c0012b2218aa8566516765fe318bf5222918e5  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/MeetingTwoOut.xml
15. 4d0c272dcc3bd0b21d1cb302e5d24722181b4bf3  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/MeetingTwoOutCommitments.xml
16. 5ff8cedb572d53031ceafa3cb1aebf5c278ec97a  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/MeetingTwoIn.xml
17. 0d7c3da02b6d0b6e79e99656f7c05abe400b93d1  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/MeetingTwoOut.xml
18. 568db7ba3a1756669771479928e8bb2c4fd11716  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/MeetingTwoOutCommitments.xml
19. d7e9d4bd64580025515c5acb9adfa057e48560b7  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/PrintCodes.xml
20. d7e9d4bd64580025515c5acb9adfa057e48560b7  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/PrintCodes.xml
21. d7e9d4bd64580025515c5acb9adfa057e48560b7  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/PrintCodes.xml
22. d7e9d4bd64580025515c5acb9adfa057e48560b7  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/PrintCodes.xml
23. d7e9d4bd64580025515c5acb9adfa057e48560b7  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/PrintCodes.xml
24. d7e9d4bd64580025515c5acb9adfa057e48560b7  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/PrintCodes.xml

The data was uploaded after the meeting yesterday. The Upload completed at 12:13am last night (according to the commits mailing list). Links to mirrors at GWU and Takoma Park will be posted as soon as they are available.

Here is a sha1sum for the files in the directory:

1. 560ee468d9dbde07b2a9bb0c2f2c8630b34312d9  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/get_latest_djia_stock_prices.py
2. a5258eac1018e827b132a25029f4e5146be2ef6a  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/post_election_audit.bat
3. a3e315e00a3e4c3d9a3a2cbcd34759da9f5c37f9  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/post_election_audit.py
4. 2268498e536c339d9b2aaefc0f2124a5fb33e55e  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/pre_election_audit.bat
5. d543c66ff076926f9d412ea96662c3735143465b  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/pre_election_audit.py
6. 3ebd1fa4ae4ffad0c2787b1f35d877767b349407  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/background.pdf
7. 80c6b04eb7ea35b90d5ffea6550c81a897a447f8  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/election.log
8. 26431928c2b279ab5ce3dd80121253e9248dd2f4  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/ElectionSpec.xml
9. 21670c785c9a167e52e91f350b7b7fe9671a56a3  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/geometry.xml
10. 482a9cfdd4175bea5e213aa06d46b428fa5624dc  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/MeetingOneIn.xml
11. 9667b274ca0eab76b6e3ebc125ac3aa81327e415  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/MeetingOneOut.xml
12. ad568b7a8981797be6826813d036e9aa447d1f69  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/partitions.xml
13. 0b5cb004df38138e5ba06555890cd5ea2044c2f6  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward1/pubkey
14. f5fee3d1cfc2a58e2110d54200b2f398b8f094f9  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/background.pdf
15. 767dd7af75841efb83496a672c5366338cff41b3  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/election.log
16. 26431928c2b279ab5ce3dd80121253e9248dd2f4  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/ElectionSpec.xml
17. 21670c785c9a167e52e91f350b7b7fe9671a56a3  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/geometry.xml
18. ff5cb5026951d4be848af66404fe9c26645ac03e  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/MeetingOneIn.xml
19. 3b17b932950b865dd2bd48cbbbd18ed947243f1c  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/MeetingOneOut.xml
20. ad568b7a8981797be6826813d036e9aa447d1f69  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward2/partitions.xml
21. 63bbc89729fe56a1fe1e03a84151d78e6bef3a96  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/background.pdf
22. 4d0acd99e40d26dd5dd5f91fd29ea9f5ad3d1fe4  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/election.log
23. 26431928c2b279ab5ce3dd80121253e9248dd2f4  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/ElectionSpec.xml
24. 21670c785c9a167e52e91f350b7b7fe9671a56a3  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/geometry.xml
25. cdd3e729b9df39182c354e3b4de0adfdf3fb65b1  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/MeetingOneIn.xml
26. 70f78f0267f6f17125d06edee525a6edd0f39f37  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/MeetingOneOut.xml
27. ad568b7a8981797be6826813d036e9aa447d1f69  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward3/partitions.xml
28. 773b2cce25d55df4b78d2d7f5936ddcddccbf0ed  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/background.pdf
29. 5f1e28af55edd26ff70028f0a28ab14cadc12dd5  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/election.log
30. 26431928c2b279ab5ce3dd80121253e9248dd2f4  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/ElectionSpec.xml
31. 21670c785c9a167e52e91f350b7b7fe9671a56a3  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/geometry.xml
32. 1983012f84f3705406935851757e036f74537ac7  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/MeetingOneIn.xml
33. 44679c49318ff3de066f349e411fef400dd527b3  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/MeetingOneOut.xml
34. ad568b7a8981797be6826813d036e9aa447d1f69  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward4/partitions.xml
35. f275395b9d5b22be75f19d0197c0ba989f9090b0  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/background.pdf
36. 68cfc18857396c2dd3b3bc8599f8e997b4388477  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/election.log
37. 26431928c2b279ab5ce3dd80121253e9248dd2f4  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/ElectionSpec.xml
38. 21670c785c9a167e52e91f350b7b7fe9671a56a3  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/geometry.xml
39. ab90f2a7c850d9f3a81e2ecd1bbb9da6169bd577  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/MeetingOneIn.xml
40. 1ca7973d8d8fcef65299cccab9aa14381772ff20  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/MeetingOneOut.xml
41. ad568b7a8981797be6826813d036e9aa447d1f69  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward5/partitions.xml
42. 9a50a5fefb10b90d8c344292932f5b5317bd13fc  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/background.pdf
43. 9504fbd2861189afa04ee4abf43f1a19f854f07e  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/election.log
44. 70f41bc40f0aa37d8500dab919230c7d25e90199  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/ElectionSpec.xml
45. 61323501a2acf2837e34e4d3464b9aea51aa1db1  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/geometry.xml
46. 0233180cb7547382ce7080a4bb1f50a6b129ff4e  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/MeetingOneIn.xml
47. b9ba5551ec679d5ede0e6014be958978f5a9b2c2  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/MeetingOneOut.xml
48. ad568b7a8981797be6826813d036e9aa447d1f69  ./PUBLIC/PUBLIC/ward6/partitions.xml

Help us win a donation to build our optical scanners for the Takoma Park election.

Vote for our entry on the Ideablob website

I just got back from a test of Scantegrity for Maryland Day this year. If you’re interested, please go check the results! Special thanks to Dr. Paul Herrnson for providing the exposure and the space to make this possible!

TAKOMA PARK BOARD OF ELECTIONS

MOCK ELECTION

Saturday, April 11, 10 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., in the Community Center Azalea Room

(during the City’s Arbor Day Celebration)

Join the Takoma Park Board of Elections in testing the Scantegrity voting system on Saturday, April 11.  [Map it]

Who can vote in the Mock Election?

Anyone can vote. Voters in the mock election do not need to be registered voters, although Takoma Park registered voters are especially encouraged to test the system:

• City residents, family and friends
• Non-residents
• High school students
• Election advocates
• Anyone interested in testing the new voting system

How long will it take?

The Mock Election will be structured like a regular election. Voters will check in, receive a voter authority card, receive a ballot, mark the ballot, scan the ballot and deposit it in the ballot box. Participants in the mock election may stop in to vote any time between the hours of 10:00 a.m. (polls open) and 2:00 p.m. (polls close).

Just like a regular election, the time it takes to vote depends upon how many people are there. Since this is a mock election, we don’t expect long lines; it will probably take just a few minutes to cast a vote.

After casting their vote in the Mock Election, voters may leave or, if they wish, voters may stay a bit longer to fill out a questionnaire and chat about the system with members of the Scantegrity Voting System Group and members of the Takoma Park Board of Elections.

Light refreshments will be served throughout the day.

Source: Takoma Park City website.

The Arbor day mock election results are now available!

Thanks to everyone who came out to vote, and be sure to check your ballots!

From Gazette.net:

Ron Rivest discusses Scantegrity during the 2009 RSA Conference Cryptographers Panel (starting at 13:’30″):

I think voting is the core of our democracy, and it’s (also) a security problem–one of the hardest ones to solve because of voter privacy. There’s (actually) a novel coming out called Cassandra Chanting about the risks of voting, (written) by Anonymous–we don’t know who wrote it! (But) voting is making progress: cryptography is starting to become more used within voting. We had a wonderful mock election in Maryland–the board of elections in Takoma Park, Maryland had a mock election on Arbor Day where you could vote for your favorite tree. This is preparatory to running a real election in November with the Scantegrity system which has cryptography behind the scenes, but to the voter it looks very much like an optical scan system (but) with confirmation codes you get that you can look up on the web later to see that your vote counted. We’re trying to take the tools we’ve developed in cryptography–and the mindset–and integrate it into one of our most important democratic processes. And we’re making progress there.